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Abstract In a recent article, Emanuel Rutten has presented a novel argument for
the existence of God, defined as a personal being that is the first cause of reality. An
interesting feature of the argument, which caused quite a stir, is that it does not fall
within any of the traditional categories of arguments for God’s existence. Rutten
calls his argument a modal-epistemic one, which reflects the fact that the first
premise of his argument states that all possible truths are knowable. The main
purpose of this article is a simple one: to point out that Rutten’s modal-epistemic
argument is flawed.
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Introduction
In a recent article (Rutten 2014), Emanuel Rutten presents a novel argument for the
existence of God, defined as a personal being that is the first cause of reality. A first
interesting feature of the argument is that it does not fall within any of the traditional
categories of arguments for God’s existence. In particular, Rutten’s argument is
neither an ontological, cosmological nor teleological argument.1 Rutten calls his
argument a modal-epistemic one, which reflects the fact that the first premise of his
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1 See, for instance, Sobel (2004) for a concise overview of various ontological, cosmological and
teleological arguments for God’s existence. To be sure, further categories of arguments for God’s
existence exists such as moral arguments (cf. Adams 1987), but Rutten’s argument does not fall within
any of these further categories either.
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argument roughly states that all possibly true propositions are knowable. The second
premise states that the proposition that God does not exist is not knowable. Then it
validly follows from these two premises that God exists necessarily.
A second interesting feature of Rutten’s argument is that it caused quite a stir,
partly as a result of circumstances that Rutten (2012c: 7) describes, in his doctoral
thesis, as follows.
Next, I would like to extend special thanks to Alexander Pruss who responded
so enthusiastically on my new modal-epistemic argument for the existence of
God, which resulted in its publication on Prosblogion which, in turn, led to it
being mentioned on the website of the New York Times.
Ever since, Rutten’s argument was and is widely discussed and hotly debated, on
various philosophical websites as well as in more traditional media. However, the
argument has, up till now, hardly received any attention in academic journals.2
Given the two interesting features of the argument that I mentioned above, I feel that
such is regrettable.
In this article I scrutinize the modal-epistemic argument and point out that it is
seriously flawed. In order to do so I first give, in ‘‘The modal-epistemic argument’’
section, a rigorous presentation of the modal-epistemic argument. ‘‘Worries about
the first premise’’ section takes the second premise of the argument for granted and
scrutinizes its first premise. I present counterexamples to the first premise and argue
that the only way in which Rutten can save his premise from my counterexamples is
by presupposing the conclusion of the modal-epistemic argument, which is
dialectically inappropriate. In the section ‘‘Worries about the second premise’’, I
argue that the second premise of the argument is false: given the notions of ‘God’
and ‘knowability’ that figure in the modal-epistemic argument, it turns out to be
knowable that God does not exist. ‘‘The modal-epistemic core argument’’ section
presents what I call the modal-epistemic core argument. This variant of the modal-
epistemic argument lays bare the core features of Rutten’s argument and allows us
see its rationale and flaws more clearly. Further, the core argument allows us to
formulate a parody objection to the modal-epistemic argument. The parody
argument shows that the standards of reasoning that Rutten appeals to, in order to
conclude that it is necessarily true that God exists, also allow one to conclude that it
is necessarily true that Saul Kripke exists. The final section, ‘‘Conclusion’’,
concludes.
2 An exception is Gijsbers (2012) which criticizes the modal-epistemic argument that appeared in
Rutten’s doctoral thesis (Rutten 2012c) and also in Rutten (2012a). See Rutten (2012b) for a reply to the
critique of Gijsbers. In this article however, I am concerned with the modal-epistemic argument of Rutten
(2014) which substantially improves his earlier argument as explained in footnote 3 and in Sect. 2.2.
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The modal-epistemic argument
The simplified modal-epistemic argument
Without further ado, let me present what Rutten (2014: 388) calls the simplified
version of the modal-epistemic argument,3 which is the following valid argument
with conclusion C and premises P1 and P2.
The simplified modal-epistemic argument (abridged version)
P1 All possibly true propositions are knowable.
P2 The proposition that God does not exist is not knowable.
C The proposition that God exists is necessarily true.
I will explain the manner in which Rutten understands the crucial notions of his
argument, God, knowledge and (im)possibility, in turn. I will unpack the content of
these notions and use this unpacking to formulate the unabridged version of the
above argument; by doing so I spell out how P1, P2 and C must be understood.
As already explained, the notion of God that figures in the argument is that of a
personal being that is the first cause of reality, i.e. a personal first cause. Thus,
whereas in our colloquial language ‘God’ functions as a name, in the (simplified)
modal-epistemic argument, ‘God’ is an abbreviation for the description ‘a personal
first cause’. In order to get a grip on the modal-epistemic argument, it will be
instructive to make this explicit. In order to do so, let me introduce the predicates
‘Personal being’ and ‘First cause of reality’ so that the proposition that God exists,
i.e. the proposition that there is a personal first cause, may be expressed as
9xðPðxÞ ^ FðxÞÞ.
Rutten (2014: 387) argues that the notion of a first cause entails that if a first
cause exists, then it is unique. For if x is a first cause, x is the direct or originating
cause of everything else besides x, whereas x itself is not caused. Now suppose that
there is more than one first cause and let A and B be two distinct first causes. Being a
first cause, A must have caused everything besides itself and so in particular A must
have caused B. But then B is caused, which contradicts the assumption that B was a
first cause. Hence, if the simplified modal-epistemic argument is not only valid but
also sound, it also establishes that the proposition that there is a unique personal first
cause is necessarily true.
Now that we know what Rutten means with ‘God’, let us focus on the notion of
knowledge that figures in P1 and P2. As Rutten (2014: 387) explains, this notion is
such that ‘knowledge requires near-certainty that has been produced in an
epistemically proper way’ and ‘for a subject S to know that a proposition p is
true, S’s epistemic position must be such that S cannot sincerely or genuinely doubt
that p is true’. More concrete and helpful is Rutten’s description of the (only) four
3 Note: what is called the simplified modal-epistemic argument in Rutten (2014) is the actual modal-
epistemic argument as given in Rutten (2012a) and Rutten (2012c). Indeed, the modal-epistemic
argument of Rutten (2014) is an improvement of the simplified modal-epistemic argument (which is
identical to the modal-epistemic argument of Rutten (2012a; c)), as explained in ‘‘The modal-epistemic
argument’’ section.
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possible knowledge sources than can ensure that a subject knows a proposition on
his conception of knowledge.
...the ways to attain the required degree of certainty [for a subject to know a
proposition] are exhausted by the following four options: (i) a proposition is
deductively proven; (ii) a proposition is obviously true, i.e. intuitively self-
evident; (iii) a proposition is grounded in indisputable experience; or (iv) a
proposition is based on indisputable testimony. Rutten (2014: 387)
Rutten’s argument (2014: 391) for premise P2 proceeds by establishing that no one
can know, on the basis of these four possible sources of knowledge, that God does
not exist. Irrespective of the validity of this argument, to which we will return later,
it should be noted that Rutten is claiming that it is unknowable that God does not
exist according to his conception of knowledge. In order to make explicit that it is
Rutten’s stringent and specific conception of knowledge that figures in the
(simplified) modal epistemic argument, I will refer to this conception as knowledgeR.
It will be instructive to illustrate the difference between our colloquial use of ‘knowing
that’ on the one hand and ‘knowingR that’ on the other in terms of proposition (1)
below.
The population of New York is larger than that of Amsterdam. ð1Þ
In terms of our colloquial use of ‘knowing that’, many people do in fact know (1).
However, no actual existing human being knowsR (1), as Rutten (2014: 397) rightly
acknowledges. Nevertheless, Rutten argues that (1) is knowable R, which he does by
asking us to consider ‘an extra-terrestrial civilization whose members can observe
an extensive geographical area on our planet with the same immediacy and resulting
degree of certainty as we can observe our hands’. A member of this extra-terrestrial
civilization can knowR (1) on the basis of indisputable observation, i.e. on the basis
of knowledge source (iii). Hence, (1) is knowableR.
Finally, let us turn to the notion of (im)possibility. In order to do so in a
convenient manner, we introduce the propositional operators ‘’, which reads as ‘it
is possible that’, ‘h’, which reads as ‘it is necessary that’ and ‘KR’, which reads as
‘some subject knowsR that’. The notational conventions that we just introduced
allow us to express the simplified modal-epistemic argument in a concise manner:
premise P1 says that 8p ðp ! KRpÞ, premise P2 that :  KR :9xðPðxÞ ^ FðxÞÞ
and the conclusion C says that h 9xðPðxÞ ^ FðxÞÞ. The operators h and  express
metaphysical necessity and possibility respectively and have their meaning
governed by the possible world semantics of the modal logic S5 (Rutten 2014:
388). This means that a proposition of form hu is true just in case u is true in every
possible world and that a proposition of form u is true just in case u is true in some
possible world4. The possible world semantics allows us to spell out the content of
P1, P2, and C in the following precise way, which brings us to the unabridged
version of the simplified modal-epistemic argument.
The simplified modal-epistemic argument (unabridged version)
4 Throughout the paper, I will use ‘possible world’ as shorthand for ‘metaphysically possible world’.
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P1 For every proposition p that is true in some possible world w there is some
possible world w0 (such that p is true in w0 and) such that there is a subject in w0
that knowsR that p.
P2 It is not the case that there is a possible world in which there is a subject that
knowsR that there is no personal first cause.
C In every possible world there is a personal first cause.
The conclusion C of the simplified modal-epistemic argument is thus that every
possible world harbours a personal first cause. It further follows from the definition
of a first cause that if C is true, every possible world harbours a unique personal first
cause. From this, it does not follow that every possible world harbours the same
personal first cause. Indeed, it is compatible with the necessity of there being a
unique personal first cause that the personal first cause in possible world w has
different properties than the personal first cause in possible world w0. Unfortunately,
this observation is somewhat obscured by Rutten’s short and convenient presen-
tation of his conclusion as ‘the proposition that God exists is necessarily true’.
Before we proceed a clarificatory remark is in order. It may have struck the
reader that P1, P2 and C are used both for the constituents of the abridged and for
the unabridged version of the simplified modal-epistemic argument. This is indeed
the case and justified by the fact that the content of the abridged constituents is the
same as the content of their unabridged counterparts: the abridged version of the
argument is nothing but a convenient abbreviation of the unabridged version. I will
sometimes exploit the notions of the abridged version, as doing so allows me to save
some space. When I do so, let it be understood that the content of these notions is to
be unpacked as in the unabridged version of the argument.
The modal-epistemic argument
Rutten argues that it is necessarily true that God exists. But he does not do so by
invoking the simplified modal-epistemic argument, the reason being that premise
P1, as stated, is unacceptable. The genuine, unsimplified, modal-epistemic argument
restricts the quantifier in P1 to a subclass of propositions in order to avoid certain
counterexamples to P1. One type of such counterexamples may be illustrated by
considering the following proposition.
There is extraterrestrial life and nobody knowsR it: ð2Þ
Intuitively, proposition (2) seems a clear instance of a proposition that is possibly
true. In fact, our actual world might be such that it renders (2) true. But clearly, (2)
is not knowableR. To see this, suppose that there is a world w in which (2) is true and
in which there is a subject S that knowsR that (2). As S knowsR that (2) and as
knowledgeR of a conjunction implies knowledgeR of both conjuncts, S knowsR that
there is extraterrestrial life. Hence, there is somebody who knowsR that there is
extraterrestrial life. But then the right conjunct of (2) is false, which renders (2)
false, which contradicts the assumption that (2) is true in w. Hence there are no
worlds in which it is both true and knownR that (2): proposition (2) is not
knowableR.
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Proposition (2), and propositions like it, confront us with a dilemma. Either we
must give up our judgement that (2) is a clear instance of a possible truth, or we
must give up premise P1. Rutten opts for the latter and proposes that propositions
like (2) must be banned from the range of P1’s quantifier. He does so by invoking
the distinction between first-order and second-order propositions. A first-order
proposition, an example of which is ‘there is extraterrestrial life’, only states
something about the world itself. A second-order proposition, an example of which
is ‘Jan knowsR that there is extraterrestrial life’ also states something about the
propositional attitudes of a subject.5 Proposition (2) is a second-order proposition
and Rutten proposes to modify P1 by restricting its quantifier to first-order
propositions. Indeed, whereas (2) is a counterexample to P1, it is not a
counterexample to premise P01, where:
P01 All possibly true first-order propositions are knowableR.
As ‘there is no personal first cause’ is a first-order proposition, the conclusion
that it is necessarily true that there is a personal first cause also follows from P01 and
P2.
Be that as it may, there are counterexamples to premise P01 which necessitate a
further restriction of the range of its quantifier. To illustrate this, consider the
following proposition.
There are no conscious beings. ð3Þ
Just as proposition (2), proposition (3) seems a clear instance of a proposition that is
possibly true. And just like proposition (2), proposition (3) is a counterexample to
P1. For suppose that there is a world in which (3) is true and in which there is a
subject that knowsR that (3). This is impossible, as the truth of (3) implies that there
are no conscious beings and hence there is no being that can knowR (3) or any
proposition whatsoever. Thus there are no worlds in which (3) is both true and
knownR: proposition (3) is not knowableR. Unlike proposition (2) though, propo-
sition (3) is a first-order proposition, and so it confronts us with a further dilemma:
either we must give up our judgement that (3) is a clear instance of a possible truth,
or we must give up premise P01. Again, Rutten opts for the latter and proposes to ban
propositions like (3) from the range of P01’s quantifier. Rutten remarks that no
conscious being can believe (3) consistently as having any belief, and so in par-
ticular the belief that (3), commits one to the further belief that there are conscious
beings, which contradicts one’s initial belief. Rutten observes that the same remarks
apply to propositions like ‘nothing exists’ or ‘there only exists dead matter’ and he
calls proposition like these not consistently believable. Rutten takes it that these
examples suffice to delineate the notion of a (not) consistently believable propo-
sition and does not provide any further explication of that notion. However, it seems
that on any reasonable explication of that notion, in order for a proposition to be
consistently believable, it must be logically possible.6
5 There are also higher-order propositions. For instance, ‘Jan knowsR that Piet knowsR that snow is
white’ is an example of a third-order proposition.
6 I owe this insight to an anonymous referee.
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At any rate, Rutten proposes to restrict the range of the quantifier of P01 to those
first-order propositions that are consistently believable. Calling First-order Consis-
tently believable propositions FoCons propositions, the further restriction of P01
results in premise P001.
P001 All possibly true FoCons propositions are knowableR.
Now everything is in place to formulate the modal-epistemic argument which, for
sake of definiteness, we do in its unabridged form.
The modal-epistemic argument (unabridged version)
P001 For every FoCons proposition p that is true in some possible world w there is
some possible world w0 (such that p is true in w0 and) such that there is a
subject in w0 that knowsR that p.
P2 It is not the case that there is a possible world in which there is a subject that
knowsR that there is no personal first cause.
P3 The proposition that there is no personal first cause is a FoCons proposition.
C In every possible world there is a personal first cause.
Now, given the plausible thought that all consistently believable propositions are
logically possible, P3 implies the logical possibility of the proposition that there is
no personal first cause. Observe that this does not contradict C, according to which
that same proposition is metaphysically impossible.7
With the full-blooded version of the modal-epistemic argument in place, it is now
time to assess it. The argument is valid, no doubt. But is it also sound, i.e. are its
premises true?
Worries about the first premise
The blunt denial objection
Consider the following proposition.
There is no personal first cause. ð4Þ
Just like propositions (2) and (3), proposition (4) seems to be a clear instance of a
proposition that is at least possibly true. But as it follows from premise P3 that (4) is
a FoCons proposition, (4) must be knowableR according to P
00
1. However, premise P2
exactly denies that (4) is knowableR. Hence, we have:
If ð4Þ is possibly true then P001;P2 or P3 is false. ð5Þ
Note that (5) expresses the observation that if the conclusion of the modal-epistemic
argument is false, then one of its premises must be false. Now this observation is not
peculiar to the modal-epistemic argument, but applies to any valid argument
whatsoever. Moore (1939) uses this observation to indirectly rebut the sceptic’s
7 See also footnote 4.
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argument: Moore argued that the conclusion of the sceptic’s argument is false, as he
knew he had hands, so that one of the premises of the sceptic’s argument must be
false. The strategy of indirectly rebutting an argument by attacking its conclusion
rather than one of its premises is called the Moore-shift by Rowe (1979).8 What
about a Moore-shift of the modal-epistemic argument? Can’t we rebut the modal-
epistemic argument by pointing out that as (4) is possibly true, one of its premises
must be false. Rutten (2014: 398) thinks that doing so is ‘dialectically inappropriate’
and that ...
...bluntly denying the conclusion of the argument, in order to point out that one
of the premises must be false, isn’t a good objection.
I agree with Rutten that inferring that an argument must have a false premise from a
blunt, unmotivated denial of its conclusion is, in general, not a good objection to an
argument: I agree that the Blunt Denial Objection is not a good one. That being said,
a well-motivated, non-blunt, denial of its conclusion can very well constitute a
legitimate objection to the modal-epistemic argument. However, in what follows, I
will not argue for the falsity of the conclusion, but rather for the falsity of two of the
premises of the modal-epistemic argument. In ‘‘The blunt denial objection’’ section
I argue (assuming the truth of P2 and P3) that premise P
00
1 is false. In section ‘‘A
counterexample to premise P001’’ I argue that P2 is false.
A counterexample to premise P001
For the purposes of this section, we take (Rutten’s argument for) the truth of
premise P2 for granted and we (naturally) also accept P3. Given these background
assumptions we will now investigate whether or not P001 is true. In order to do so,
consider the following proposition.
The only conscious beings are naturally evolved animals and humans. ð6Þ
Proposition (6) seems to be a clear instance of a proposition that is possibly true. In
fact, a typical atheist and quite some scientists think that (6) is actually true.
Moreover, (6) is both logically consistent and conceivable which, on a liberal notion
of metaphysical possibility, are jointly sufficient for the (metaphysically) possible
truth of (6). Although Rutten does not further pin down the notion of possibility that
figures in the modal-epistemic argument, apart from specifying that it is meta-
physical possibility which is at stake, Rutten is clearly committed to a liberal notion
of metaphysical possibility. Indeed, Rutten (2014: 396–397) asks us to consider
amongst others the following (metaphysically) possible worlds; a world where ‘God
exists, in which God is good and in which God knows his moral nature by indis-
putable experience in the form of introspection’; a world where ‘God exists and
decides not to create anything’ and in which ‘God exists and knows all logical and
mathematical truths by direct intuition, including all Go¨del propositions’. I do not
have any qualms with a liberal notion of metaphysical possibility. However, given
8 Rowe (1979) is concerned with the argument from evil, a well-known argument for atheism. Rowe
argues that the theist’s best response to the argument from evil consist of a Moore-shift of that argument.
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such a liberal notion, (6) must be regarded as possibly true. Let us now turn to the
knowabilityR of (6).
Rutten’s argument (2014: 391) for premise P2, i.e. for the unknowabilityR of (4),
proceeds by establishing that no subject can know, on the basis of knowledge
sources (i)–(iv), that there is no personal first cause. As already indicated above, we
accept (at least in this section) Rutten’s argument for P2. His argument for the
unknowabilityR of (4), however, readily carries over into an argument for the
unknowabilityR of (6). First, Rutten claims that to knowR that there is no personal
first cause via knowledge source (i) comes down to showing that the notion of a
personal first cause is contradictory. Such is not the case and so one cannot know (4)
on the basis of knowledge source (i). But then, as the notion of a conscious being
that is neither an animal nor a human is also non-contradictory, one cannot come to
knowR proposition (6) on the basis of knowledge source (i). Second, as (6) is neither
self-evident nor obviously true, one cannot come to knowR (6) on the basis of
knowledge source (ii). Third, as one can never experience ‘that everything that
exists has indeed been experienced’ one cannot conclude on the basis of experience,
whatever its contents are, that there are neither non-human nor non-animal
conscious beings: one cannot come to knowR (6) on the basis of source (iii). The
fourth and final knowledge source (iv) is that of indisputable testimony. From the
truth of (6), it follows that every potential testifier is an animal or human being. But
no (animal or) human being, whatever her reliability, is able to put another (animal
or) human being in an epistemic position in which he can no longer ‘sincerely or
genuinely doubt that (6) is true’. Hence, (6) is a FoCons proposition which is
unknowableR.
Another and more informative way to see that (6) must be unknowableR is as
follows. Observe that (6) implies9 (4): if the only conscious beings are naturally
evolved animals and human beings (with the first conscious beings coming into
existence after the Hadean Eon) there is no personal first cause of reality. To
establish that (6) is unknowableR, observe that any subject that knowsR (6) is also in
the position to knowR (4) on the basis of Modus Ponens and the fact that (6) implies
(4). Hence if (6) is knowableR, so is (4). But as premise P2—whose truth we take for
granted in this section—exactly tells us that (4) is unknowableR, it follows by
contraposition that (6) must also be unknowableR. Indeed, it is the mere fact that (6)
implies (4) that allows us to conclude that (6) is unknowableR: any proposition that
implies (4) must be unknowableR. Calling propositions that imply (4) God-deniers,
we may record this observation as the following fact.
GDU If P2 is true then any God-denier is unknowableR.
Now in contrast to God-denier (4), to accept God-denier (6) as possibly true is not to
bluntly deny the conclusion C of the modal-epistemic argument. For one thing, (6)
does not mention the notion of a personal first cause at all, but involves more
mundane notions such as ‘animal’, ‘human’ and ‘conscious being’. Then again, as
(6) implies (4), accepting (6) as possibly true involves an implicit denial of C. So
9 If one doubts whether (6) implies (4) simply add ‘and the first conscious beings came into existence
after the Hadean Eon’ to the content of (6).
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then, can Rutten save his modal-epistemic argument by declaring (6) to be an
illegitimate counterexample to P001 because taking it as such involves an implicit
denial of C?
Appealing to implicit denials is question-begging
Here are two reasons as to why Rutten cannot rule out (6) as an illegitimate
counterexample to P001 by appealing to the fact that (6) involves an implicit denial of
C.
First, ruling out (6) as an illegitimate counterexample to P001 because it involves an
implicit denial of C is simply question-begging. Remember that I am not bluntly
denying that ‘there is a personal first cause’ is necessarily true and that therefore one
of the premises of the modal-epistemic argument must be false: I am not raising the
Blunt Denial Objection. Rather, I charitably accept premises P2 and P3 as
unproblematic truths and I am assessing whether I should also accept P001. Now (6) is
a FoCons proposition that is a clear example of a proposition that, given Rutten’s
notion of metaphysical possibility, must be regarded as possibly true. But it is not
knowableR. Hence (6) is a counterexample to P
00
1. To say that it is an illegitimate
counterexample because taking it as such implies that C is false is question-begging,
as we are invited to accept C on the basis of P001 and the other two premises.
Second, consider again proposition (3), i.e. the proposition that there are no
conscious beings. If there are no conscious beings, then there is no personal first
cause. Hence proposition (3) also implies (4) and so accepting (3) as possibly true
also involves an implicit denial of C. And so Rutten could also have saved P01 from
counterexample (3) by appealing to an implicit denial of C: he could have said that
(3) is not possibly true as taking it as such would come down to an implicit denial of
C. He could have, but he did not. Rather, he chose to invoke the notion of a
consistently believable proposition to save P01 from (3). Now if the only motivation
for the restriction to consistently believable proposition were the mere fact that it
saves P01 from counterexamples, the restriction could rightfully be called ad hoc.
However, Rutten (2014: 392) explains that such is not the case as ‘belief is, after all,
a condition on knowledge, so if a proposition cannot be believed consistently in the
first place, it cannot figure in claims about knowability’. Let us accept that the
restriction to consistently believable propositions is not ad hoc for the reasons that
Rutten states above: a proposition that is not consistently believable is definitely not
knowableR and so propositions such as (3) should not be allowed to spoil the
conceptual relation between possible truth and knowabilityR that is echoed in the
first premise. Fair enough. But is (3) possibly true? Clearly, Rutten must think that it
is not: for if (3) is possibly true, there must be a world in which there is no personal
first cause, which contradicts Rutten’s conclusion that every possible world
harbours a personal first case. Although Rutten may very well think that (3) can’t be
possibly true on the basis of C he can, of course, not appeal to this impossibility
when arguing for the truth of his premises, as he clearly realizes:
If classical theists are right that God’s existence is necessary, then ‘There are
no conscious beings’ is a necessary falsehood. But in the present context, of
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course, classical theism cannot be presupposed. And as I said before,
necessary existence is not part of my conception of God. Rutten (2014: 392)
Indeed, when developing an argument whose purported conclusion is that it is
necessarily true that a personal first cause exists, one cannot presuppose (a position
from which it follows) that it is necessarily true that such a cause exists. Moreover,
in such a context one cannot argue that (3) is not possibly true as such follows from
a presupposition that it is necessarily true that God exists. Hence, Rutten rightly
acknowledges that if his argument is to have any bite at all, he cannot rule out (3) as
possibly true in virtue of a position which presupposes the conclusion of his
argument. Classical theism is such a position, but another such position is the view
that all God-deniers are necessarily false. Hence, the implicit denial move is not
acceptable by Rutten’s own standards: just as it is inappropriate to rule out (3) as
possibly true in virtue of classical theism, so it is inappropriate to rule out (6)
because it involves an implicit denial of C.
To sum up, as proposition (6) is unknowableR, premise P
00
1 can only be true when
(6) is necessarily false. And so in order to soundly conclude C from P001 and the other
premises, one must argue that (6) is necessarily false. To say that (6) is necessarily
false as it involves an implicit denial of C or to simply presuppose that (6) is
necessarily false is question-begging, which also seems to be recognized by Rutten
himself, given his remarks on (3).
In this section we investigated premise P001 and took it for granted that premise P2
is true. In the next section, we will investigate premise P2 and argue that it is false.
Worries about the second premise
A parity objection to the modal epistemic argument
Before we present our qualms with premise P2, we will first present an objection to
the modal-epistemic argument that Rutten discusses and dismisses in his paper.
Doing so is instructive, as Rutten’s rebuttal of this so-called parity objection paves
the way for our argument against P2.
One of the potential objections to his argument that Rutten discusses and
dismisses in his paper is the following parity objection: just as it is impossible to
knowR that there is no personal first cause, it is also impossible to knowR that there
is a personal first cause. Together with P001 and P3, the unknowabilityR of ‘there is a
personal first cause’ entails that it is necessarily false that God does exist. Hence, the
modal-epistemic argument is flawed. Or so the parity objection goes.
Rutten shows that the parity objection is untenable by arguing that it is possible
to knowR that there is a personal first cause. He does so along the following lines.
There is a possible world in which there is a (unique) personal first cause, called
God, and in which God knowsR that he is the personal first cause. Rutten (2014:
395) suggests that God can knowR this either on the basis of ‘indisputable inner
experience of his own nature’, i.e. on the basis of knowledge source (iii), or that it
may be that ‘God knows that he is God by direct intuition’, i.e. by knowledge source
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(ii). Further, Rutten suggest that as God is the personal first cause, everything that is
originates with God, and so God is in ‘a maximally ideal cognitive situation’ and so
‘plausibly also knows himself to be in that situation’. With respect to this last
suggestion, Rutten does not explicitly mention the knowledge source that gives rise
to God’s knowingR that he is the personal first cause. However, it seems plausible
that it must originate in source (iii): God’s indisputable experience of creating the
world.
Thus, Rutten sketches three possible ways in which a personal first cause can
knowR that he is the personal first cause: the proposition that God exists is, pace the
parity objection, knowableR. I will not dispute the legitimacy of Rutten’s rebuttal of
the parity objection. I take it for granted that the notions of metaphysical possibility
and knowledgeR allow Rutten to establish that the proposition that there is a
personal first cause is knowableR. However, I will show that these same notions also
allow us to establish that the proposition that there is no personal first cause is
knowableR, and hence show that premise P2 is false.
A counterexample to premise P2
In order to show that premise P2 is false, consider a possible world in which there
are (exactly) two personal uncaused causes, which we call A and B. These uncaused
causes are co-creators of the world in the sense that everything that there is, except
for A and B, (which are uncaused and so not created) is jointly created by A and B.
The sketched situation may be conveniently summarized by the following
proposition.
There are exactly 2 personal uncaused causes that co-created the world. ð7Þ
The situation involving A and B that we sketched above gives rise to a possible
world in which (7) is true. Indeed, given the notion of metaphysical im(possibility)
to which Rutten appeals, (7) must be considered as a possible truth. Or if not, Rutten
would have to explain why (7) is necessarily false whereas he regards the following
proposition as possibly (in fact necessarily) true.
There is exactly 1 personal uncaused cause that created the world. ð8Þ
As we explained in ‘‘The modal-epistemic argument’’ section, it follows from the
notion of a first cause that such a cause is an uncaused creator of the world (apart
from itself) and that if such a cause exists, it is unique. Hence, (8) is a mere
restatement of the proposition that there is a personal first cause and Rutten
effectively argues that it is possible to knowR (8). The central tenet in Rutten’s
argument for the knowabilityR of (8), is that it is possible for the (unique) personal
first cause to knowR its own nature in at least three ways. But then, it seems
naturally that there is also a possible world in which (7) is true and in which the two
personal uncaused causes that co-created the world (both) knowR that (7). For
instance, if A and B co-created the world, they can plausibly knowR that they did on
the basis of source (iii): their indisputable experience of creating the world. And to
the extent that it is plausible that a personal first cause can knowR that he is a
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personal first cause on the basis of direct intuition, it is also plausible that a personal
co-creator of the world can knowR that he is such a co-creator on the basis of direct
intuition. Finally, to the extent that it is plausible that a personal first cause can
knowR that he is a personal first cause on the basis of an indisputable inner expe-
rience of his own nature, it is also plausible that a personal co-creator of the world
can knowR that he is such a co-creator on the basis of an indisputable inner expe-
rience of his own nature. Indeed, to the extent that is plausible that a personal first
cause can knowR (8), it is also plausible that a personal co-creator of the world, such
as A, can knowR (7). But, as (7) implies that (8) is false, when A knowsR (7) he is
also in a position to knowR that (8) is false. And hence there is a subject, namely A,
who can knowR that there is no personal first cause. Hence premise P2 is false.
Or is it? It will be instructive to consider (and dismiss) a potential rejoinder of my
argument for the falsity of P2. One might consider arguing that ‘‘A and B taken
together’’ constitute a personal first cause so that (7) does not, in contrast to what I
claim, imply the falsity of (8). However, this argument is bound to fail. Granted, if
the entity denoted by ‘‘A and B taken together’’, i.e. the fusion or mereological sum
of A and B exists, that fusion definitely counts as a first cause. Further, according to
mereological universalim (cf. Schaffer 2017), the fusion of any two objects exists
and so in particular the fusion of A and B. However, whereas the existence of the
fusion of A and B guarantees the existence of a first cause, it does not guarantee the
existence of a personal first cause. Rutten (2014: 386) explains that a personal being
is a ‘somebody not something [and] is therefore capable of knowledge (and thus of
belief, reason, intuition, and experience)’. It seems outrageous to claim that these
properties, ascribed to personal beings, carry over to the fusion of such beings. At
any rate, to claim that these properties do carry over needs a sustained metaphysical
argument that is not to be found in current mereological theories.
This concludes our assessment proper of the status of modal-epistemic argument,
which we have shown to be flawed. In the next section we will present what we call
the modal-epistemic core argument. This variant of the modal-epistemic argument
lays bare the core features of Rutten’s argument and allows us to see its rationale
and flaws more clearly.
The modal-epistemic core argument
In order to argue that certain alleged counterexamples to P001 are just that, alleged
counterexamples, Rutten appeals to God as a possible knowerR. For instance, when
confronted with the alleged unknowabilityR of proposition (9),
There is a personal first cause, ð9Þ
Rutten points out that it is possible that there is a personal first cause who knowsR
(9), as we explained in the previous section. Another example of a proposition
whose knowabilityR is established by appealing to God is (10).
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A Spaghetti monster does not exist. ð10Þ
In order to argue that (10) is knowableR, Rutten (2014: 396) points out that there is a
possible world in which there is a personal first cause that decides to create nothing.
In this world, the personal first cause knowsR (10) and so (10) does not give rise to a
counterexample to P001. Finally, in order to establish that so-called Go¨del proposi-
tions, i.e. propositions that are possibly true but that are not provable in any proper
mathematical axiom system, are knowableR, Rutten (2014: 397) asks us to consider
‘a possible world in which God exists and in which God’s immediate rational
intuition about logical and mathematical propositions is perfect. In this world, God
knows all logical and mathematical truths by direct intuition, including all Go¨del
propositions.’
Now Rutten’s appeal to God to ensure the knowabilityR of propositions such as
(9), (10) or Go¨del propositions may not be necessary: perhaps such propositions can
also be knownR by other subjects. Then again, Rutten’s appeal to God to ensure the
knowabilityR of such propositions trivially reveals that he takes it to be possible that
a personal first cause knowsR these propositions. In fact, it seems that a great many
propositions are knowableR by a personal first cause. More precisely, it seems that
Rutten is committed to:
() A proposition p is knowableR by some subject if and only if p is knowableR by
a personal first cause.
As any personal first cause is a subject, the right-to-left direction of () is trivially
true. Rutten, however, is also committed to the left-to-right direction of (), which
follows from his use of the notion of a personal first cause, in particular from how he
uses this notion to argue for the knowabilityR of propositions such as (9), (10) or
Go¨del propositions. To be sure, I am not claiming that () is true, but only that
Rutten is committed to (). In fact, in the previous section I presented a
counterexample to (). There I argued that (4), i.e. the proposition that there is no
personal first cause, is knowableR by a personal uncaused cause that co-created the
world. Hence (4) is knowableR by some subject but clearly not knowableR by a
personal first cause. Rutten, of course, cannot accept (4) as a counterexample to ()
as doing so comes down to accepting that P2 is false. More generally, it follows
from GDU that if P2 is true, every God-denier is unknowableR and hence Rutten
cannot accept any God-denier as a counterexample to (). As Rutten’s use of the
notions of knowabilityR and personal first cause do not seem to allow for any
counterexample to () other than a God-denier, the conclusion that Rutten is
committed to () is warranted.
Now it immediately follows from () that premises P001 and P2 are equivalent to
P1 and P

2 respectively, where:
P1 All possibly true FoCons propositions are knowableR by a personal first cause.
P2 The proposition that there is no personal first cause is not knowableR by a
personal first cause.
To be sure, P1 does not say that there is a personal first cause that is omniscient.
What it does say, in its unabridged form, is that for any proposition p that is true in
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some possible world w, there is some world w0 in which there is a personal first
cause who knowsR that p. Premise P

2 is a tautology whose truth cannot be doubted.
The (valid) argument with premises P1, P

2 and P3 and conclusion C we will call
the (modal-epistemic) core argument. A nice feature of the core argument is that it
clearly lays bare the essential flaw of the modal-epistemic argument, as we will
explain below.
The modal-epistemic argument exploits the notion of knowabilityR, which is a
very demanding conception of knowledge, according to which human beings cannot
even knowR mundane truths such as (1). However, the modal-epistemic argument
also exploits a very liberal notion of metaphysical possibility (cf. ‘‘A counterex-
ample to premise P001’’ section), ensuring that whereas humans can hardly knowR any
possible truth, a vast amount of possible truths is nevertheless knowableR by some
metaphysically possible subject. A central and dual role is reserved for those
metaphysically possible subjects that satisfy the description ‘a personal first cause’.
On the one hand, a personal first cause is considered to be a very strong knowerR, as
witnessed by Rutten’s commitment to (). As such, the notion of a personal first
cause seems to be tailor-made to ensure the truth of P001. On the other hand, it is very
hard to knowR something (for subjects that do not satisfy the description ‘a personal
first cause’) about a personal first cause, as witnessed by Rutten’s discussion of
propositions like (9) and premise P2 . As such, the notion of a personal first cause
seems to be tailor-made to ensure the truth of P2.
The central and dual role of the notion of a personal first cause is thus supposed
to ensure the truth of both P001 and P2, and this core feature of the modal-epistemic
argument is vividly illustrated by the core argument. First, it is trivially true that no
proposition that implies that there is no personal first cause is knowableR by a
personal first cause. And so, in contrast to P001, premise P

1 wears its presupposition—
that all God-deniers are necessarily false—on its sleeves. As such, the core
argument thus allows us to see more clearly the main flaw of the modal-epistemic
argument. Second, given the presupposition that all God-deniers are necessarily
false, premise P2 is effectively a tautology as no necessarily false proposition, and
so in particular not God-denier (4), is knowableR. Although the formulation of
premise P2 hides this tautological character, this character is clearly revealed by P

2.
Indeed, the basic structure of the modal-epistemic argument is the same as that of
the core-argument; the core-argument simply reveals that the modal-epistemic
argument presupposes its conclusion in a more explicit way. To accept C on the
basis of the modal-epistemic argument is just as reasonable as to accept this
conclusion on the basis of the core argument.
Let me finish this section by presenting a parody objection to the core argument
and so by extension to the modal-epistemic argument. The first premise of the
parody argument does not involve a restriction to FoCon propositions but rather to
FolKri propositions. A FolKri proposition is any proposition that is expressible by a
sentence of a first-order language with identity, without any predicate or function
symbols and with a single constant symbol j that refers to Saul Kripke. Thus the
proposition that everything is self-identical, which can be expressed as ‘8xðx ¼ xÞ’
is a true FolKri proposition. The proposition that not everything is identical to Saul
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Kripke, ‘:8xðx ¼ jÞ’ is another true FolKri proposition. These FolKri propositions
are not only (possibly) true but also knowableR by Saul Kripke (who knows his
logic). In fact, it seems rather plausible that every possibly true FolKri proposition is
knowableR by Saul Kripke, which is the first premise of the modal-epistemic
argument for Kripke’s necessary existence.
The modal-epistemic argument for Kripke’s necessary existence.
K1 All possibly true FolKri propositions are knowableR by Saul Kripke.
K2 The proposition that Saul Kripke does not exist is not knowableR by Saul
Kripke.
K3 The proposition that Saul Kripke does not exist is a FolKri proposition.
CK The proposition that Saul Kripke exists is necessarily true.
I believe that Saul Kripke exists. But I do not believe that he necessarily does so.
My beliefs about Kripke are unaffected by the modal-epistemic argument for his
necessary existence. Similarly, my beliefs about the (necessary) existence of God
are unaffected by Rutten’s modal-epistemic argument.
Conclusion
I argued that Rutten’s modal-epistemic argument is flawed: attempts to argue for its
first premise are either question-begging or render the modal-epistemic argument
redundant and its second premise is false. As an afterthought, I presented the modal-
epistemic core argument, a variant of the modal-epistemic argument which clearly
reveals the rationale and flaws of Rutten’s argument.
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